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GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judge.  
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 As a police officer, Mark Icker used his badge to harass, 
grope, and force oral sex on several women.  Icker pled guilty 
only to depriving individuals of their civil rights under color of 
law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242.  His convictions under § 242 
are not “sex offenses” under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act (“SORNA”), 34 U.S.C. § 20901 et seq.  
Nevertheless, the District Court mandated that, as a condition 
of his supervised release term, Icker “comply with the 
requirements of [SORNA] as directed by the probation officer, 
the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex offender registration 
agency in the location where [he] reside[s], work[s], [is] a 
student, or [was] convicted of a qualifying offense.”  App. 4.  
But a district court cannot discretionarily order a defendant 
who is not convicted of any “sex offense” under SORNA to 
register under the statute.  Any imposition of SORNA 
registration requirements on such a defendant constitutes plain 
error.  This issue is the crux of this appeal.  
 We first determine that because Icker was not convicted 
of any sex offenses, and because the record shows he was not 
given notice of any potential SORNA registration 
requirements, we will not enforce his appellate waiver as he 
did not enter into it knowingly and voluntarily.  Reaching the 
merits of Icker’s claims, we hold that the District Court plainly 
erred by mandating that Icker comply with SORNA 
requirements.  Icker was not convicted of any “sex offense” 
under SORNA.  Because SORNA does not extend to other 
offenses, Icker cannot be subject to its terms.  To the extent the 
Government argues that because the District Court imposed 
Icker’s registration “as directed” by a third party, any 
delegation of Icker’s status as a “sex offender” to a third party 
is an improper delegation of Article III powers.  Therefore, we 
will vacate the judgment of conviction and remand with 
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directions to vacate the SORNA conditions of Icker’s 
supervised release.  
I. BACKGROUND 
 
A. Factual Background 
 From March 2018 until his termination, Icker worked as 
a part-time uniformed police officer in Luzerne and 
Lackawanna counties in Pennsylvania.  During this time, and 
in his capacity as a police officer, Icker pulled over two 
women—S.R., age 22, and R.V., age 32—while they were 
driving alone during late night hours.   
 In both instances, Icker pulled over and detained the 
women, claiming that they had violated vehicle codes and 
appeared intoxicated or that he could smell marijuana.  Icker 
then handcuffed the women and searched their cars.  During 
the search of the cars, Icker claimed to find more incriminating 
evidence—in one instance a pill bottle and in another, 
marijuana.   
 Icker confronted both women with the items he found 
in their cars and warned them that they would face 
consequences as a result of further charges (both women had 
previous involvement with the criminal justice system).  He 
then advised both women that those charges could put them in 
violation of their supervision or bond, and that they could face 
imprisonment. 
 Icker later asked each woman “How can you help me 
help you?” or “What can you do for me to help you?” as a way 
to ask for oral sex.  PSR ¶ 5.  Afterwards, in each instance, 
Icker drove the victim’s car to a location out of view and 
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transported the victim in his police cruiser to a different 
location—either a park or the police station bathroom.  Icker 
coerced both women into performing oral sex on him.  
 In addition to these two instances, Icker groped or 
harassed three other women, using his authority as a police 
officer.   
B. Procedural Background 
 From December 2018 through April 2019, authorities 
brought various charges against Icker.  Icker later entered into 
a written plea agreement (the “Plea Agreement”) under which 
he agreed to plead guilty to two counts of depriving R.V. and 
S.R. of their civil right to bodily integrity under 
18 U.S.C. § 242.  The Plea Agreement included several 
sentencing guidelines references, including that the parties 
jointly recommended a 144-month term of imprisonment.  The 
Plea Agreement also included several special conditions of 
supervised release.  There was no reference to SORNA 
registration as a special condition in the Plea Agreement. 
 As part of the Plea Agreement, Icker also waived his 
right to direct appeal:  
28. Appeal waiver - Direct.  The defendant is 
aware that Title 28, United States Code, § 1291 
affords a defendant the right to appeal a 
judgment of conviction and sentence; and that 
Title 18, United States Code, § 3742(a) affords a 
defendant the right to appeal the sentence 
imposed. Acknowledging all of this, the 
defendant knowingly waives the right to appeal 
the conviction and sentence.  This waiver 
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includes any and all possible grounds for appeal, 
whether constitutional or non-constitutional, 
including, but not limited to, the manner in 
which that sentence was determined in light of 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).  
The defendant further acknowledges that this 
appeal waiver is binding only upon the defendant 
and that the United States retains its right to 
appeal in this case. 
App. 46.   
 The Government filed a two-count information in the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania against Icker.  Icker then appeared at a 
sentencing hearing before the District Court, which rejected the 
agreed upon 144-month term of imprisonment and instead 
sentenced Icker to a 180-month term.  At the sentencing 
hearing, Icker did not object to the presentence report, which 
listed SORNA registration as a condition of release, despite the 
District Court’s invitation to do so.  The District Court did not 
mention SORNA during the sentencing hearing, but the Court 
referenced SORNA twice in its judgment of conviction.  First, 
under “Mandatory Conditions,” the District Court checked the 
following box: 
You must comply with the requirements of the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(34 U.S.C. § 20901, et seq.) as directed by the 
probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any 
state sex offender registration agency in the 
location where you reside, work, are a student, or 
were convicted of a qualifying offense. (check if 
applicable)[.] 
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Id. at 4.  
 Second, the “Additional Supervised Release Terms,” 
included the following:  
You must comply with the requirements of the 
Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act 
(42 U.S.C. § 16901, et seq.) as directed by the 
probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any 
state sex offender registration agency in the 
location where you reside, work, are a student, 
or were convicted of a qualifying offense[.]  
Id. at 6.1   
 Icker then filed this timely appeal. 
II. JURISDICTION 
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 
3231.  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(a).   
III. APPELLATE WAIVER 
 Although Icker signed an appellate waiver, he contends 
that the waiver does not preclude this Court’s review.2  The 
Government argues that the appellate waiver applies given that 
 
1 The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act is now 
located at 34 U.S.C. § 20901.   
2 Icker’s waiver explicitly covered “the right to appeal the 
conviction and sentence” including “any and all possible 
grounds for appeal, whether constitutional or non-
constitutional[.]”  App. 46 (emphasis added). 
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its broad language reaches the conditions of supervised release.  
Additionally, the Government contends that the waiver was 
entered into knowingly and voluntarily given the language of 
the waiver and the District Court’s colloquy with Icker.  Our 
review of the validity and scope of appellate waivers is plenary.  
United States v. Jackson, 523 F.3d 234, 237 (3d Cir. 2008).  
 Waivers of appeal are generally permissible regardless 
of the merits of the claim, and courts must construe them 
strictly.  United States v. Khattak, 273 F.3d 557, 558, 561–62 
(3d Cir. 2001).  We will generally decline to entertain an appeal 
and will enforce an appellate waiver when “(1) . . . the issues 
[the defendant] pursues on appeal fall within the scope of his 
appellate waiver and (2) . . . he knowingly and voluntarily 
agreed to the appellate waiver, unless (3) enforcing the waiver 
would work a miscarriage of justice.”  United States v. Wilson, 
707 F.3d 412, 414 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting United States v. 
Dahmen, 675 F.3d 244, 249 (3d Cir. 2012)) (alteration in 
original).   
 Thus, to determine whether an appellate waiver was 
knowingly and voluntarily agreed to, we must look to the 
context surrounding the defendant’s acceptance of the waiver.  
See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 563.  Here, Icker did not knowingly 
and voluntarily agree to the waiver of this appeal.  Thus, we 
decline to enforce the waiver.3   
 
3 Even if Icker’s appellate waiver was entered into knowingly 
and voluntarily, and the scope of the waiver covered this 
appeal, enforcing this waiver would be a miscarriage of justice.  
See Khattak, 273 F.3d at 562.  Here (1) the error was clear, as 
discussed infra, (2) the error is grave, (3) the error presents a 
legal question, not a fact question, (4) the error creates a 
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 First, Icker’s Plea Agreement sets forth many special 
conditions of supervised release but fails to make any reference 
to SORNA registration.  Because the Plea Agreement never 
mentioned any SORNA requirements, and because Icker did 
not plead guilty to any “sex offense” under SORNA as part of 
that agreement, he had no reason to know that he would be 
subject to SORNA.  Second, while the District Court addressed 
the appellate waiver with Icker during the plea colloquy, it did 
so without specific reference to SORNA.4 
 Thus, neither the terms of the Plea Agreement nor the 
in-person colloquy mentioned or discussed a SORNA 
registration condition.  Moreover, this void in information and 
notice establishes that Icker could not have understood that he 
was waiving his right to appeal a SORNA registration 
condition.  The fact that Icker admitted to sexual conduct is not 
 
burdensome obligation for Icker, and (5) the impact to the 
Government in correcting this error would be minimal.  See id. 
at 563.  Our case law favors reaching the merits. 
4 During the plea colloquy, the District Court asked: 
Do you also understand that under circumstances 
normally you and/or the government would have 
the right to appeal any sentence that is imposed 
in the case, but as part of your plea agreement in 
this case, you have agreed to waive or give up 
your right to appeal the sentence? Do you 
understand that?  
App. 57.  Icker affirmed that he understood.  This was the 
extent of the District Court’s discussion of the waiver with 
Icker before he entered his plea.  The District Court did not 
discuss the breadth, scope, or covered conditions of his 
supervised release. 
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enough for him to be on notice of potential SORNA 
requirements when his Plea Agreement and plea colloquy did 
not mention such additional conditions, and he had not been 
convicted of any sex offenses under SORNA. As a result, 
Icker’s appellate waiver does not apply on these facts, and we 
will proceed to the merits of his appeal. 
IV. SORNA REGISTRATION 
 
A. SORNA 
 The United States Congress enacted the SORNA as 
Title I of the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 
2006.  Congress passed SORNA “to protect the public from 
sex offenders and offenders against children” by 
“establish[ing] a comprehensive national system for the 
registration of [sex] offenders.”  34 U.S.C. § 20901.  SORNA 
“reflects Congress’ awareness that pre-Act registration law 
consisted of a patchwork of federal and 50 individual state 
registration systems.”  Reynolds v. United States, 565 U.S. 432, 
435 (2012).  
 Consistent with its goals, SORNA registration 
requirements apply to state and federal “sex offender[s].”  See 
34 U.S.C. §§ 20911, 20913.  SORNA defines “sex offender” 
to mean “an individual who [has been] convicted of a sex 
offense.”  Id. § 20911(1).  With certain exceptions not 
applicable here, SORNA defines “sex offense” to include: 
(i) a criminal offense that has an element 
involving a sexual act or sexual contact with 
another; 
(ii) a criminal offense that is a specified offense 
against a minor; 
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(iii) a Federal offense (including an offense 
prosecuted under section 1152 or 1153 of title 
18) under section 1591, or chapter 109A, 110 
(other than section 2257, 2257A, or 2258), or 
117, of title 18; 
(iv) a military offense specified by the Secretary 
of Defense under section 115(a)(8)(C)(i) of 
Public Law 105-119 (10 U.S.C. 951 note); or 
(v) an attempt or conspiracy to commit an 
offense described in clauses (i) through (iv). 
 
Id. at § 20911(5)(A). 
 SORNA specifies that all sex offenders “shall register, 
and keep the registration current, in each jurisdiction where the 
offender” lives, works, or attends school.  Id. § 20913(a).  
When an offender changes his name, residence, employment, 
or student status, within three business days the offender must 
appear in person in at least one jurisdiction where the offender 
lives, works, or is a student to notify that jurisdiction of the 
change in registration information.  Id. § 20913(c).  SORNA 
also requires that the jurisdiction receiving this information 
immediately provide it to all other jurisdictions in which the 
offender must register to achieve a comprehensive national 
registry.  Id.  Failure to comply with SORNA can lead to 
criminal penalties.  Id. § 20913(e); see 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a).  
B. The District Court Committed Plain Error 
 We review a district court’s decision to impose a 
condition of supervised release for abuse of discretion.  United 
States v. Loy, 237 F.3d 251, 256 (3d Cir. 2001).  When, 
however, a defendant fails to object to a specific condition at 
sentencing, as is the case here, we review for plain error.  
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United States v. Maurer, 639 F.3d 72, 77 (3d Cir. 2011).  The 
Supreme Court has described a four-part inquiry for plain-error 
review under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 52(b): 
“[t]here must (1) be an ‘error’ that (2) is ‘plain’ and (3) ‘affects 
substantial rights’” of the defendant.  United States v. Williams, 
974 F.3d 320, 340 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting United States v. 
Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993)).  “If these three conditions 
are satisfied, then it is within the sound discretion of the court 
of appeals to correct the forfeited error—but only if (4) the 
error seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.”  Id. (quotation marks 
omitted) (quoting Olano, 507 U.S. at 732).   
a. A Defendant Who Is Not Convicted of a Sex Offense 
Cannot Be Subject to SORNA’s Registration Requirements 
 Icker’s convictions for depriving individuals of their 
civil rights under color of law, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 242, are 
not “sex offenses” under SORNA.5  However, the Government 
 
5 During oral argument, the Government asserted that a 
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 242 could be a sex offense.  
Given that this conviction is not an enumerated offense under 
34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A), the criminal offense must be one that 
“has an element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with 
another.”  34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A)(i).  Section 242 of Title 18 
of the United States Code requires only that, under color of 
law, Icker willfully deprived a victim of her liberty without due 
process of law, which includes the right to bodily integrity.  18 
U.S.C. § 242; see United States v. Shaw, 891 F.3d 441, 446–
47 (3d Cir. 2018).  The Government asks us to read the statute 
broadly and assume that because Icker’s criminal conduct was, 
in part, sexual, we should find that his convictions constitute a 
“sex offense.”  But to do so would read the statute so broadly 
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argues that because the conduct of Icker’s criminal acts is 
“‘reasonably related’ to the sexual abuse of women,” the 
District Court did not err by choosing to discretionarily impose 
SORNA registration requirements.  Appellee’s Br. 23.  We 
agree with Icker that because he was not convicted of a “sex 
offense” under SORNA, the District Court cannot impose 
SORNA requirements.  The District Court’s imposition here 
was thus error, and plainly so, because it contradicted the 
language of the statute and it affected Icker’s substantial rights.   
 A district court lacks the authority to require a defendant 
to register under SORNA if he or she has not been convicted 
of a “sex offense,” as defined by 34 U.S.C.  § 20911(5)(A).  
The Government maintains that, while SORNA “certainly 
defines what constitutes a ‘sex offense,’ nothing in SORNA’s 
statutory scheme limits registration to only those convicted of 
such offenses.”  Appellee’s Letter Br. 2 (emphasis added).  
Thus, the Government asserts there are instances in which 
SORNA registration may not be required under the statute, but 
a sentencing court can find that it is still warranted and can 
impose SORNA registration requirements at its discretion.  We 
reject this interpretation and application of SORNA.   
 First, by its terms, SORNA is limited to sex offenses.  
See United States v. Brown, 740 F.3d 145, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(“Congress was careful to delineate specific circumstances in 
which a conviction involving sex will not lead to classification 
as an offender under SORNA.”).  Here, the District Court 
plainly erred when it expanded the scope of SORNA, applying 
 
as to include crimes such as battery, which can involve no 
sexual conduct.  Further, such determinations should be left to 
a jury or fact finder, not assumed to exist based on the facts on 
appeal.  
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it to a defendant who was never convicted of a “sex offense” 
as defined by SORNA itself, as the language of the statute is 
clear as to its limited scope. 
 As discussed, SORNA defines “sex offense” to include 
specific enumerated offenses or “a criminal offense that has an 
element involving a sexual act or sexual contact with another.”  
34 U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A).  Icker was convicted of depriving 
individuals of their civil rights under color of law in violation 
of 18 U.S.C. § 242.  This  crime does not fall within the scope 
of § 20911(5)(A), which clearly enumerates crimes or requires 
that an element of the crime involve sexual conduct.   
 Second, while a district court has broad discretion to 
impose conditions of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3583, this power is limited by statute, and SORNA 
registration is specifically limited to those required by the 
statute to comply.  Pursuant to § 3583, in exercising its 
discretion, the district court’s conditions must (1) be 
“reasonably related” to the sentencing factors of § 3553, (2) 
“involve[] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably 
necessary for [those] purposes,” and (3) be “consistent with 
any pertinent policy statements issued by the Sentencing 
Commission.”6  18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)–(3).   
 
6 Nothing prevents a district court from using its authority to 
impose other conditions that would also likely be given to a sex 
offender, such as counselling, therapy, or mental health 
evaluations.  See, e.g., Wilson, 707 F.3d at 416 (affirming a 
district court’s condition requiring a mental health assessment, 
and, if necessary, a mental health treatment program, for a 
defendant who pleaded guilty to drug charges).  
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 Section 3583(d), however, makes two explicit 
references to SORNA: that (1) “[t]he court shall order, as an 
explicit condition of supervised release for a person required 
to register under [SORNA], that the person comply with the 
requirements of that Act,” and that (2) “the court may order, as 
an explicit condition of supervised release for a person who is 
a felon and required to register under [SORNA], that the 
person submit” his or her person, residence, and property to 
searches by various officials.  Id. at. § 3583(d) (emphasis 
added).  This language carries over to other sections of the 
statute—first, concerning when “a defendant required to 
register under [SORNA]” commits certain crimes, id. at § 
3583(k), and second, concerning whether the court may 
impose additional conditions “if [the defendant is] required to 
register under [SORNA],” id. at § 3563(b)(23) (emphasis 
added).   
 To read § 3583 to also allow district courts to impose 
SORNA compliance on persons not required to register by the 
terms of SORNA itself would make these references 
superfluous.  See United States v. Cooper, 396 F.3d 308, 312 
(3d Cir. 2005) (“It is a well known canon of statutory 
construction that courts should construe statutory language to 
avoid interpretations that would render any phrase 
superfluous.”).  
 It is not within a district court’s power to broaden a 
statute and its application, but even if it could do so, SORNA 
could not be practically imposed on a person who has not been 
convicted of a sex offense.  Individuals required to register for 
SORNA are subject to its requirements for a term of years or 
for life based on the “tier” that their offense falls within.  34 
U.S.C. § 20915(a) (noting a tier I sex offender must register for 
fifteen years, a tier II sex offender must register for twenty-five 
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years, and a tier III sex offender must register for life).  If there 
is no “sex offense” to tie the registration to, the text of SORNA 
does not dictate the duration of required registration.  Thus, if 
SORNA were allowed to be imposed on non-sex offenders, 
how long must they register for?  The answer is unclear.  In 
following the Government’s argument, a defendant convicted 
of a lesser offense could ostensibly be given lifetime 
registration requirements despite SORNA’s specific intent to 
limit registration based on the severity of the offense.  See id.  
Thus, the plain language of SORNA does not anticipate any 
discretionary application of its requirements.   
 We therefore conclude that a discretionary imposition 
of SORNA on non-sex offenders is plainly erroneous.   
b. The Judgment of Conviction Required Registration 
 The Government also maintains that the District Court 
did not mandate a SORNA registration requirement, and thus 
Icker cannot appeal the District Court’s judgment of 
conviction.  According to the Government, the District Court 
did “not simply say ‘You must register as a sex offender 
pursuant to SORNA’” but instead “impose[d] a conditional 
directive to comply with SORNA only ‘as directed by the 
probation officer, the Bureau of Prisons, or any state sex 
offender registration agency.’” Appellee’s Br. 19 (emphasis in 
original).  The Government asserts that because registration 
under SORNA was conditional on a determination by third 
parties, this Court has no basis to review.  We disagree.  
 The governing statutory language provides that:  
The court shall order, as an explicit condition of 
supervised release for a person required to 
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register under the Sex Offender Registration and 
Notification Act, that the person comply with the 
requirements of that Act. 
18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (emphasis added).  The plain language of 
the statute requires that a court determine whether the 
defendant has been convicted of “sex offense” as defined in 34 
U.S.C. § 20911(5)(A), which is appropriate because the 
question of whether an offense is a “sex offense” is one of law.  
See Brown, 740 F.3d at 149.   
 Further, the language of the judgment of conviction 
states that Icker “must comply with the requirements of 
[SORNA] as directed by the probation officer, the Bureau of 
Prisons, or any state sex offender registration agency in the 
location where you reside, work, are a student, or were 
convicted of a qualifying offense.”  App. 4 (emphasis added); 
see also App. 6.  While it is true that these third parties would 
dictate the actual procedures Icker must follow, the District 
Court still is not conditionally requiring him to comply with 
SORNA.   
 If we were to take the Government’s view of “must 
comply as directed,” we would be impermissibly placing the 
legal analysis of determining what constitutes a “sex offense” 
with the probation office, the Bureau of Prisons, or state 
agencies, which would establish an impermissible delegation 
of Article III powers.  See United States v. Pruden, 398 F.3d 
241, 251 (3d Cir. 2005) (explaining that it is “‘an 
impermissible delegation of judicial authority’” to allow the 
probation office to determine whether a defendant is required 
to undergo mental health intervention, but it is permissible to 
delegate to the probation office “‘the details with respect to the 
selection and schedule of the program’” (quoting United States 
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v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 85 (2d Cir. 2001)); Loy, 237 F.3d at 
266 (noting that a “sentencing court may not wholesaledly 
‘abdicate[] its judicial responsibility’ for setting the conditions 
of release” by having the probation office determine what the 
word “pornography” entails) (quoting  United States v. 
Mohammad, 53 F.3d 1426, 1438 (7th Cir. 1995)) (alteration in 
original).  It is not permissible to give a “probation officer an 
unfettered power of interpretation.”  Loy, 237 F.3d at 266.  
 Accepting the Government’s position would be an 
extraordinary delegation of power to  probation offices, who 
are in the business of executing and implementing judicial 
orders, not analyzing, evaluating and making legal 
determinations on questions of law, and other such parties.7  
Because it is beyond the power of Article III courts to delegate 
the duty of determining who is a sex offender to the probation 
office, Bureau of Prisons or state agency, we find this argument 
unavailing.   
V. CONCLUSION 
 For these reasons, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment of conviction and remand with directions to modify 
the District Court’s Judgment to remove the SORNA-related 
conditions. 
 
7 The Government’s position is further weakened when testing 
its practicality. The Government posits that Icker should wait 
to appeal this point until after the probation office, Bureau of 
Prisons, or a state agency orders compliance with SORNA.  
Certainly waiver would be a difficult, if not insurmountable, 
barrier to relief at that point.  Not surprisingly, the Government 
chose not to opine on this point. 
